Introduction
I-thoughts are thoughts about one"s own mental states or about "oneself" in some sense (Bennett 1988) . They are closely linked to what psychologists call "metacognition"; that is, "cognitions" about other cognitions or mental representations (Metcalfe & Shimamura 1994; Koriat 2007) . There seems to be growing evidence that many animals are indeed capable of having I-thoughts as well as have the ability to understand the mental states of others (Terrace & Metcalfe 2005; Hurley & Nudds 2006) .
There is also a relevant philosophical theory of consciousness; namely, the "higher-order thought" (HOT) theory of consciousness which says that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought about that state Rosenthal 2005) . For various reasons, such thoughts are typically understood to take the form "I am in mental state M now." A higher-order thought, then, is a kind of meta-cognition. It is a mental state directed at another mental state. So, for example, my desire to write a good book chapter becomes conscious when I am (noninferentially) "aware" of the desire. Intuitively, it seems that conscious states, as opposed to unconscious ones, are mental states that I am "aware of" in some representational sense (Lycan 2001) . In a case of subliminal perception, I am not aware that I am in that perceptual state. Thus, it is unconscious. However, when I become aware that I am having that perception, it becomes conscious.
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An often cited problem, however, is that the HOT theory rules out animal consciousness because animals (or at least most animals) are incapable of having such thoughts; they do not possess such sophisticated "I-concepts" and "mental concepts." This is a common objection normally offered by non-HOT theorists, such as Fred Dretske (1995) , Robert Lurz (2002), and Bill Seager (2004) . Moreover, one prominent HOT theorist, Peter Carruthers, actually embraces this alleged consequence of the HOT theory (Carruthers 2000 (Carruthers , 2005 . I have had my say elsewhere on Carruthers" contention that animal consciousness is very unlikely given the truth of some form of HOT theory (Gennaro 1996 (Gennaro , 2004b (Gennaro , 2006 . I won"t repeat those arguments here except to say that a higher-order thought need not be as sophisticated as it might seem. Since most of us believe that many animals have conscious mental states, a HOT theorist must explain how animals can have the higher-order thoughts necessary for such states. One reason most of us believe that animals have conscious states is simply because our folk psychology is a theory of conscious mental states and it works well in explaining and predicting much of animal behavior.
Thus, there is a three-way tension among the following claims that needs to be relieved: (a) Most animals have conscious mental states, i.e. there are generally positive common sense grounds for believing that animals have conscious states, (b) The HOT theory is true, which, in turn, entails having I-thoughts, and (c) Few (if any) animals are capable of having I-thoughts based on various empirical and theoretical considerations.
Carruthers rejects (a) and embraces (b) and (c), while Dretske, Lurz, and Seager endorse (a) and (c) but reject (b). I reject (c) and accept (a) and (b). Thus, this chapter has a double purpose: to discuss and elaborate upon the evidence for higher-order 3 thoughts (or I-thoughts) in animals but also to show that the HOT theory is indeed consistent with animal consciousness. In section 2, I will argue that recent experimental evidence on animal memory and meta-cognition strongly suggests that many animals have the self-concepts and mental state concepts necessary to form I-thoughts. In section 3, I reply to the claim that having I-thoughts requires having thoughts (and thus concepts) directed at others' mental states. The stakes are high because if the HOT theory is true, any evidence indicating the absence of I-thoughts would also cast doubt on animal consciousness itself.
It is also crucial at the outset to note one important subtlety of the HOT theory.
When a conscious mental state is a first-order world-directed state, the higher-order thought is not itself conscious. When the higher-order thought is itself conscious, there is a yet higher-order (or third-order) thought directed at the second-order state. In this case, we have introspection which involves a conscious higher-order thought directed at an inner mental state. When one introspects, one's attention is directed back into one's mind.
For example, what makes my desire to write a good book chapter a conscious first-order desire is that there is a (unconscious) higher-order thought directed at the desire. In this case, my conscious focus is directed at the entry and my computer screen, so I am not consciously aware of having the higher-order thought from the first-person point of view.
When I introspect that desire, however, I then have a conscious higher-order thought (accompanied by a yet higher, third-order, thought) directed at the desire itself. An additional rationale for this aspect of the HOT theory is to serve as a reply to the objection that it is circular or leads to an infinite regress. It might seem that the HOT theory results in circularity by defining consciousness in terms of higher-order thoughts.
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It also might seem that an infinite regress results because a conscious mental state must be accompanied by a higher-order thought, which, in turn, must be accompanied by another higher-order thought ad infinitum. The standard reply is to remind the objector that the initial higher-order thought need not itself be conscious.
Of course, the very concept of "consciousness" is notoriously ambiguous, but perhaps the most commonly used contemporary notion of a "conscious" mental state is captured by Thomas Nagel"s famous "what it is like" sense (Nagel 1974) . When I am in a conscious mental state, there is "something it is like" for me to be in that state from the subjective or first-person point of view. This is how I will use the term.
I-thoughts and HOTs in animals
It is sometimes said that all or most (non-human) animals cannot "mindread"; that is, do not understand that others (or even they) have mental states. And adherence to the so-called "theory-theory" view of mindreading, whereby understanding mentalistic notions presupposes having a "folk-psychological" theory of mind, seems to rule out that animals have I-thoughts (or higher-order thoughts).
1 In addition, Carruthers (2005) , for example, cites experimental work suggesting that chimps (and very young children, for that matter) lack the mental concepts "appear" or "see" (Povinelli 2000) , which is then treated as necessary to have I-thoughts about one's own experiences. Such experiments are designed to determine if chimps take notice of whether or not the experimenter is looking at something (e.g. food) or unable to see something (e.g. due to blindfolding).
However, there seems to be growing evidence that many animals can indeed have some I-thoughts and read (other) minds in some sense. Moreover, as we will see in section 3, it is not at all clear that having I-thoughts requires reading other minds.
In any case, there are two main concepts in an I-thought (or higher-order thought);
namely, a self-concept ("I") and mental state concept ("M"). Let us consider them in turn.
2.1 Self-concepts and episodic memory in animals Episodic Memory is an explicitly conscious kind of remembering involving "mental time travel" (Tulving 1983 (Tulving , 2005 . It is, for example, often contrasted with semantic memory, which need only involve knowing that a given fact is true or what a particular object is, and procedural memory whereby memory of various learned skills is retained. Tulving also uses the term "autonoetic consciousness" for that kind of episodic remembering. The link to I-thoughts is fairly clear: some notion of self or "I" seems necessary to have a genuine episodic memory. I recognize the memory as mine and representing an event in my past. Tulving speaks of episodic memory"s "dependence on a remembering "self" [and] … relation to subjectively apprehended time" (Tulving 2005, p. 14) .
However, Tulving himself strongly resists the idea that non-human animals have episodic memory. But his case is less than convincing and he even seems to retreat from this position in the very same essay. For example, he concedes "that some of [his] assertions may be too strong (2005, p. 27 Clayton et al. 2003) have "reported ingenious and convincing demonstrations of memory for time in scrub jays" (p. 37). Scrub jays are food-caching birds and when they have food they cannot eat, they hide it and recover it later. Because some of the food is preferred but perishable (e.g. crickets), it must be eaten within a few days, while other food (e.g. nuts) is less preferred but do not perish as quickly. In cleverly designed experiments using these facts, scrub jays are shown, even days after caching, to know not only what kind of food was where but also when they had cached it (see also Clayton et al. 2006 ).
There is even more positive recent evidence for episodic memory in animals not mentioned by Tulving. Evidence in primates is discussed in the same volume in which
Tulving"s 2005 chapter appears. Menzel (2005) , for example, describes experiments in which a female chimp (Panzee) recovers food hidden by a trainer by coaxing a different trainer (who was unaware of its location) to let her get it. This was done even after quite a bit of time delay between the observation and the time at which the second trainer appeared. A similar result can be found in Schwartz (2005) with respect to a gorilla named King. And Hampton (2005) found that a monkey was able to successfully matchto-sample even after delays. The subject had to decide whether to submit to a test of the sample after the stimulus display had been removed but before the test has been presented. The results indicate that monkeys both know when they remember and when they have forgotten, indicating both a capacity for episodic memory as well as a form of meta-cognition.
Additional evidence is presented in Eichenbaum et al. (2005) whereby rats can remember the temporal order of the odors of various objects. And Dere et al. (2006) extensively review the expanding literature strongly suggesting episodic memory in a variety of animals, including dolphins, birds, and rodents (such as mice and rats).
Finally, it is interesting to note that there are also reports of animals able to plan for the future, such as is found in western scrub-jays (Raby et al. 2007) . They show that the jays plan for future need by preferentially caching food in a place where they have learned that they will be hungry the following morning. It is often observed how an ability to think about the future (i.e. "prospective memory") is closely related to the capacity for episodic memory (a point Tulving repeatedly stresses in his 2005; cf. Zentall 2005) .
Some interpretations of the above data are, to be sure, not uncontroversial in some circles and we should of course not jump to unwarranted conclusions. However, there is little reason to hold the very strong view that animals have no episodic memory or have 8 no ability at all to mentally time travel. If this is correct, then there is also no reason to deny an animal"s ability to form at least some minimal self-concept which, in turn, can figure into a higher-order thought.
Three other points are worth making here. First, it is important not to equate having episodic memories with having accurate episodic memories. That is, if an experiment really shows a lack of the accuracy of an episodic memory, we should not conclude that the animal in question has no episodic memory at all. If we compare this to human adults, we quickly see the problematic inference. Human eyewitness reports, for example, are often mistaken but we would not and should not infer any general lack of episodic memory on the part of the subject. We must be careful not to hold animals to a higher standard than we hold ourselves.
Second, I have previously argued at length that there is a compelling a priori
Kantian-style argument showing that having at least some form of episodic memory is necessary for even being a conscious creature (Gennaro 1996 , chapter nine). The basic idea is that having concepts of outer objects involves some understanding of those objects as enduring through time (since we do not take them to be mere fleeting subjective states of mind), which, in turn, requires us to think of ourselves as temporally enduring subjects with a past (mainly because we recognize that those objects are the same objects at different times). That is, if a conscious organism can re-identify the same object at different times, then it implicitly understands itself as something which endures through time.
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Third, we should recognize that there are degrees of self-concepts. We might distinguish the following four I-concepts, moving from the least to most sophisticated (initially presented in Gennaro 1993):
Level 1: I qua this thing (or "body"), as opposed to other physical things.
Level 2: I qua experiencer of mental states.
Level 3: I qua enduring thinking thing.
Level 4: I qua thinker among other thinkers.
Interestingly, one also finds a willingness to talk of a continuum of selfconsciousness in the experimental literature (e.g. Kinsbourne 2005 ) as well as corresponding levels of consciousness in human development, including the purely physical "self-other contrast" (Nelson 2005) . In any case, all that is needed for having most higher-order thoughts is the kind of minimal "bodily self-consciousness" selfconcept found in level 1; that is, being able to distinguish one"s own body from other things. And it is surely fairly uncontroversial that most animals at least have this most unsophisticated I-concept. My own view in the end is that most animals are at least capable of a level 3 self-concept and perhaps even a level 4 concept, as is evidenced by the results and arguments offered in this and the next section.
Attributing mental states to oneself and others
It is also important to point out some of the evidence for mental state attributions, i.e. the "M" side in a higher-order thought. Some of it suggests that animals have meta-cognitive states but only directed at themselves; thus, I-thoughts. We have already seen some significant evidence for this in sec 2.1 in what is sometimes termed "metamemory." If an animal has a meta-memory state, then it not only has a self-concept but it is also able to form a thought directed at a memory, which is itself a mental state.
In addition, there is the much discussed work on uncertainty monitoring with animals such as monkeys and dolphins (Smith et al. 2003; Smith 2005) . For example, a dolphin is trained in a perceptual discrimination task, first learning to identify a particular sound at a fixed frequency (the "sample" sound). Later, he learns to match other sounds to the sample sound. When presented with a sound which is either the same or different in pitch as the sample sound, he has to respond in one way if it is the same pitch (e.g.
press one paddle) and another way if it is a different pitch (press another paddle).
Eventually, the dolphin is introduced into a test environment by being forced to make very difficult discriminations. To test for the capacity to take advantage of his own uncertainty, the dolphin is presented with a third "uncertain" response that is rewarded if he is uncertain. He is presented with a third paddle, the Escape paddle, which is virtually equivalent to declining the trial. The dolphin does indeed choose the Escape paddle with expected frequency and a similar response pattern to humans and rhesus monkeys, which in turn is taken by many to suggest that he is aware of his state of uncertainty; that is, he has some knowledge of his own mental state. This is a meta-cognitive state: the dolphin is aware that he doesn"t know something, e.g. whether or not a sound matches (or is very close to) the sample sound. It seems reasonable to seek a common underlying explanation for all of the subjects involved (Browne 2004) .
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A related paradigm has to do with a subject"s (e.g. a monkey"s) ability not to accurately respond to a stimulus, but rather on the appropriateness of its level of confidence in the accuracy of a response (Son & Kornell 2005; Hampton 2005 ). Such "meta-confidence judgments" are treated as evidence of meta-cognition because the experiments are designed to elicit a "betting" judgment of the form "I am confident that I know." I won"t describe this experiment in any detail, but, for example, two rhesus macaques were tested in this way using a system of low and high risk bets. In brief, the monkeys did indeed tend to bet "high risk" much more often when they were able to make accurate confidence judgments, and bet low risk more often when responding incorrectly. Thus, they seem able to express feelings of confidence or lack of confidence about their cognitions, and so display meta-cognitive ability.
It is also crucial to note here that some authors do speak of degrees of metacognition or self-awareness in ways arguably similar to the distinction between conscious and unconscious higher-order thoughts (as described in section 1). For example, Son and Kornell (2005, pp . 300-1) interestingly speak of "implicit meta-cognition" which sounds very much like "unconscious higher-order thoughts." They refer to the "tacit metajudgment of uncertainty" as opposed to explicit meta-cognitions or self-reflective consciousness, which clearly has an affinity to the more sophisticated conscious higherorder thoughts. We may not often have evidence of such further awareness (i.e. selfreflective consciousness) because monkeys, for example, cannot verbally express their judgments. "If we did, we would then have evidence of meta-metacognition…" (p. 318).
Again, a clear example of meta-metacognition would be a conscious higher-order thought, but this is more than is required for one to have a conscious state. Thus, animals can still have unconscious higher-order thoughts continuously accompanying all of their conscious states. As Son and Kornell (2005) put it: "according to this view, we make meta-cognitive judgments constantly and without explicit knowledge of them" (p. 317, emphasis added).
Let us turn now to the ability of animals to attribute mental states to others, which is another kind of higher-order thought, albeit a thought about another's mental state.
Despite the Povinelli style experiments noted briefly early in this section, the evidence seems to be growing that at least some animals can "mindread" under other conditions. container while a human competitor was looking away; thus, apparently understanding that hearing leads to knowing on the part of human competitors). Subjects reliably picked the container that did not alert the experimenter to the fact that a grape was being removed. This suggests that monkeys take into account how auditory information can change the knowledge state of the experimenter. In addition, Rhesus monkeys also chose to take food from human competitors who could not see them, either because the humans" eyes were facing away or because their faces were blocked by an opaque barrier.
that monkeys do not prefer to steal grapes from the non-belled containers simply because the sound of bells frightens them. There was also no historical link between the competitor's observable features and his future actions; that is, subjects had no past experience hearing the bell make noise which could have been used to associate with the competitor's likely response. Now, it may be the case that a non-mindreading interpretation could still be given for virtually all such experiments. It may indeed always be possible to construct creative and very elaborate alternative first-order mental or even purely behavioral explanations for any given set of animal behaviors (Povinelli & Vonk 2006; Carruthers 2008) . A very thorough reply would be a topic for another paper. I'll only say here, first, that just because an alternative explanation is possible, it doesn"t follow that it is the best or most reasonable explanation. Second, there comes a point where such deflationary interpretations might even work for much of human behavior or for, say, the behavior of a deaf mute human who is incapable of verbal communication. Third, as Browne puts it:
"it is parsimonious to explain similar, complex, stimulus-response patterns by similar psychological mechanisms" (2004, p. 648). Thus, I side with those who hold that attributing higher-order mental states (and consciousness for that matter) is often the more parsimonious move to make. This is all the more clear when one considers other similarities between humans and other animals, such as evolutionary history and brain structure. Finally, it is worth mentioning that results similar to those described in section 2.1 regarding caching and episodic memory are applicable here as well. For example, many crows and scrub jays return alone to caches they had hidden in the presence of others and re-cache them in new places (Emery & Clayton 2001) . This suggests that they know that others know where the food is cached and thus, to avoid having their food stolen, they recache the food.
Taken together with the earlier evidence presented, it seems reasonable to think that many animals have I-thoughts of some kind or other. Although many subjects of the above experiments are primates, many other animals are also tested, such as dogs, pigs, and even mice and rats.
In the next section, I"ll consider two problematic claims which underlie some of the opposition to the above conclusions.
Two problematic claims
Some insist that if an animal cannot pass a given mind-reading task (directed at another), it is therefore incapable of having any thoughts about its own mental states. This is a very problematic claim. The thesis to be challenged, then, is:
(1) Having I-thoughts requires having thoughts directed at others" mental states.
The obvious corollary of (1) Moreover, as Ridge (pp. 322ff) also points out, the move from "no deceit" to "no HOTs whatsoever" is much too quick and unjustified. Just because evidence of intentional deception would be the best evidence of mindreading, it clearly does not follow that the lack of such evidence indicates a lack of higher-order thoughts.
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Finally, it seems to me that some tests for other-attributing thoughts in the theory of mind literature are often aimed at determining whether or not animals (or infants) can have conscious thoughts directed at another"s mental state. Speaking of "intentional deception," for example, seems to suggest that the animal is consciously intending to cause a false belief in another animal. To the extent that this is what experimenters have in mind, then there is again no reason to think the HOT theory is in trouble even if animals lack this ability. As we have seen, the HOT theory allows for the presence of conscious states even in the absence of any (either self-attributing or other-attributing) conscious higher-order thoughts. If a higher-order thought is itself conscious, then one is in a more sophisticated introspective state which is not necessary for having a more primitive first-order conscious state. Thus, thesis (1) is, at best, on very shaky ground.
Concept possession and the generality constraint
One might reply to the above that adherence to the so-called "generality constraint" dictates that if one can self-attribute a mental concept then one should be able to other-attribute that mental concept. In an effort to show this to be a serious problem for the HOT theory, Seager (2004) also cites evidence suggesting that animals do not other-attribute mental states, and then says the following:
"…all animals also lack the ability to attribute mental states to themselves because those who can self-attribute will be a subset of those who can other-attribute….It is… [a] doubtful logical possibility that a being which lacked the ability to attribute mental states to others could attribute them to itself….such an asymmetry would seem to run counter to Evans"s (1982) "generality condition" on concept possession (the claim that one cannot have a concept C unless for any object O, one can have the thought that "O is C")….What is incoherent is the notion that one could conceptualize one"s own possession of mentalistic attributes while being completely unable to form a thought of another being having mental states." (Seager 2004, pp. 264-5) For the sake of clarification, the generality constraint is sometimes put as follows:
the attribution of thoughts to any organism of the form "a is F" and "b is G" commits us to the idea that the organism should also be able to think that "a is G" or "b is F."
Moreover, we might even agree that "the content of all propositional attitudes is said to be subject to this constraint." (Toribio 2007, p. 446 ) Thus, we might also think of the generality constraint as involving a commitment to the idea that belief and desire states (which are also composed of concepts) can be recombined with other such states, and perhaps even that the organism can make appropriate simple inferences among them.
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In any case, Seager's quotation, at minimum, indicates an endorsement of thesis (2) This makes all concept users into idealized rational agents with a complete grasp of all its 18 concepts and capable of combining into thoughts all concepts that one possesses. One might instead opt for the view that possessing a concept C is one of degree which allows for "a partial understanding of C. On this intuitively attractive view, one cannot possess the concept FORTNIGHT, for example, unless one grasps that a fortnight is a period of time" (Tye 2006, p. 9) .
Even among human beings we sometimes distinguish between those who have a "partial" concept of, say, DOG and those who have, on the one extreme, "no concept at all" and, on the other, an expert biologist"s dog concept. The same might be said for the understanding that a young child has of TREE compared to an adult"s increased understanding and then finally to a botanist"s tree concept. Treating concept possession in this way would also not require all concept users to be able to draw all possible connections among one"s stock of concepts. We sometimes might not "see" the connection between two concepts or thoughts containing those concepts because we only have a partial grasp of the concepts involved. This should also be said for various animals; that is, it may be that animals have a (partial) understanding of VISION, SEE, PERCEPTION, and the like without always being able to apply those concepts to others in certain experimental situations. We should not conclude that animals have no concept of X if they are unable to pass a test for a more advanced understanding of X. This, I
suggest, is what skeptics often do when, say, a chimp doesn"t infer a concept of VISION or SEEING from certain particular movements (or lack of movements) of another"s eyes. animals may not have a very sophisticated concept of these mental states, but yet it seems that they are aware that they are in such states, e.g. a dog seems to be aware that it is seeing as opposed to, say, blind or hearing. Similarly, an animal knows when it is in pain even if it has a difficult time determining or understanding when another creature is in pain. Thus, having at least a partial understanding of the concept PAIN would involve the notion that "this hurts," as opposed, say, to comprehending philosophical writings on
pain. An animal with a DESIRE for food understands that it "wants something." And a partial understanding that one is having a VISUAL PERCEPTION involves at least grasping that one is "seeing" as opposed to, say, "hearing." As Allen puts a similar point:
"…philosophers have been tempted by the argument that…for example, a dog does not believe there is a squirrel in the tree because it lacks "the"…concept of squirrel. But there is no reason to think that having [that] belief requires that animals have that specific concept, nor that lacking the canonical concept of squirrel means that they lack any concept whatsoever" (Allen 1999, pp. 35-6) .
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Thus, another question arises when considering the plausibility of the generality constraint; namely, do we even apply the same exact mental concept to ourselves as we would to another? It is assumed by many that the concept PAIN or VISUAL EXPERIENCE that one might attribute to oneself is the same as that which one attributes to another. Then, as we have seen, the reasoning goes that since many animals can"t attribute the latter they can"t attribute the former. This is a highly questionable claim.
For one thing, if the above account of concept possession is viable, then it may just be that an organism O has a better understanding of a mental concept C when selfattributing C than when attributing it to another. And so, contra Seager and the generality constraint, it would be perfectly reasonable for an animal to be able to conceptualize its own mental states to some extent without being able to conceptualize, to the same extent or in the same way, another"s mental state. And this would be yet another reason not to accept the logic that failure of some animals to other-attribute mental concepts means that they cannot attribute them to themselves.
Attributing mental states to others seems to involve additional cognitive abilities, such as making certain inferences based on behavioral evidence, which some animals may not have. But this does not mean that they are incapable of having mental concepts at all or self-attributing them.
In any case, if I am right thus far, this bodes well for the HOT theory which only requires an (unconscious) I-thought with a self-attributing mental concept in order for an animal to have conscious mental states. Now, much of the above raises the very difficult issue of under what conditions is it reasonable to attribute any concept to a non-linguistic animal. I cannot fully address this issue here. Nonetheless, one core idea in the animal cognition literature is that the attribution of concepts is justified if there is evidence supporting the presence of a mental representation that is independent of solely perceptual information (Allen & Hauser 1991) . This view fits well with the attribution of concepts in the experiments described 22 the previous section. Following up on this, Allen (1999, pp. 36-7) proposed the following account:
An organism O may reasonably be attributed a concept of X (e.g. TREE) whenever:
(i) O systematically discriminates some Xs from some non-Xs; and
(ii) O is capable of detecting some of its own discrimination errors between Xs and non-Xs; and (iii) O is capable of learning to better discriminate Xs from non-Xs as a consequence of its capacity (ii).
As Allen notes, the above is not meant as a definition of "concept," but rather a criterion for when it is reasonable to attribute a concept X to an animal. Of course, if we are going to use it as a guide for attributing mental concepts to animals, then the X in question cannot be TREE or some external object but rather a mental concept (of which an animal arguably has at least a partial conception). We have seen that many animals seem to be able to meet condition (i); that is, they are able to distinguish one mental state from another, such as seeing from not-seeing at all (or hearing), or remembering and notremembering. For some, this may even be enough for an animal to have a mental concept since it shows at least some understanding of those concepts by way of comparison.
A case could also be made that some of the above experimental results indicate an ability to meet clauses (ii) and (iii). For example, when a chimp or dolphin or rat detects its own error in, say, a meta-confidence or meta-memory task, and then goes on to learn 23 to perform the task better on that basis, it seems to have met (ii) and (iii). So when an animal learns to improve its performance on memory or confidence tasks, it seems to have understood how to better discriminate its own mental states from one another. In addition, Allen"s own example (1999, p. 38) of pigs" "backout behavior" seems suited for this purpose. He describes cases where pigs display a self-monitoring of performance.
Some pigs would attempt to back away from the choice they had made after committing to a response they had given (on, say, a same/different perceptual task), but before any feedback was provided.
In any case, I also find little reason to accept thesis (2).
In closing, then, it is at the least, very premature to claim that animals cannot have Ithoughts at all. At best, there seems to be growing positive evidence that animals can mindread and have I-thoughts, which include various degrees of conceptual sophistication. And even if mindreading others is not found in very many animals, it doesn"t follow that no I-thoughts are present. Finally, this also means that if the HOT theory is true, we need not deny that most animals are conscious.
